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Abstract
This paper studies the consistency between a decision-maker's choices
over menus in a rst period and inside menus at a later date. The main
result shows that the comparison of commitment decisions and actual sub-
sequent choices reveals whether future taste contingencies are correctly an-
ticipated: a sophisticated individual chooses exactly the right commitment
options, whereas a naive decision-maker overlooks some protable opportu-
nities. The paper provides absolute and comparative measures of naivete
and shows under which conditions pessimistic behavior can be attributed
to the presence of self-control costs. Finally, I implement an experimental
protocol based on the theoretical analysis and nd substantial evidence of
naivete at the individual level.
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1 Introduction
The literature on time-inconsistent preferences distinguishes two types of in-
dividuals according to their beliefs regarding their own future behavior. Sophis-
ticated agents correctly anticipate their future choices, while naive individuals
underestimate their propensity to deviate from their long-term goals. A usual
observation is that present bias is not an issue per se as soon as it is correctly
forecast: a sophisticated agent has the opportunity to compensate future devia-
tions by engaging in appropriate actions (signing optimal contracts, buying com-
mitment devices, etc.). In contrast, the combination of self-control issues and
unrealistic expectations harms decision-makers. For instance, in applications of
the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model (Laibson, 1997), xing  the present-bias
parameter, the assumptions made regarding the agent's expectation of the future
value of  play an important role in welfare and policy analysis (Heidhues and
Koszegi, 2010; Koszegi, 2014; Rabin and O'Donoghue, 1999; Eliaz and Spiegler,
2006).
This paper proposes an axiomatic framework in which the sophistication hy-
pothesis can be tested by observing choice data only. The results are used to de-
sign an experimental method that oers several advantages: it allows to measure
naivete at the individual level; it allows to detect partial naivete; it is nonpara-
metric, robust to risk aversion and does not rely on functional forms or specic
hypotheses about the intertemporal preferences.
The axiomatic framework takes as a primitive the choices made by a decision-
maker at two successive periods. At a rst stage, the decision-maker chooses the
set of options that will be available in the future, as in Kreps (1979) and Dekel
et al. (2001), according to a binary preference  over menus. At a subsequent
period, the agent makes a stochastic choice inside the available menu according
to a random choice rule . The ex ante preference  is represented by a Random
Strotz model (Dekel and Lipman, 2012): in this interpretation, the agent has a
certain normative preference over the prizes but expects possible deviations in the
future, which creates a preference for smaller menus. The relation  identies
the agent's beliefs about the realization of future taste contingencies. The ex
post choice rule  is represented by a Random Expected Utility model (Gul and
Pesendorfer, 2006): in this interpretation, the choice in the menu is driven by the
realization of an uncertain taste contingency, whose distribution is also uniquely
identied from the data.
The aim of the paper is to compare the ex ante anticipation of taste contin-
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gencies suggested by  with the actual realization of ex post preferences identied
from . Section 2 provides precise denitions of sophistication and naivete in this
framework. A sophisticated agent has the right model in mind about her future
choices, meaning that her beliefs over future taste contingencies are correct. In
contrast, a naive decision-maker underestimates her future deviations. To give
content to this notion, I build on Dekel and Lipman (2012) and parameterize each
possible deviation by two parameters, its direction and its intensity, the latter
being a measure of the frequency of preference reversals with respect to long-term
goals. Naivete is dened as the situation in which the agent underestimates in a
rst-order stochastic sense the intensity of future deviations in each direction.
The main result characterizes the behavioral content of these denitions under
the form of conditions on the pair of preferences f; g. The axioms rely on simple
tests of the following form: observing the decision-maker's preference between a
choice set fp; qg and a commitment device of the form fp + (1   )qg, where 
is an exogenous probability chosen by the experimenter. fp + (1   )qg can be
interpreted as delivering p with probability  and q with probability 1  . If p is
ex ante preferred to q and if  is lower than fp;qg(p), the actual probability with
which the decision-maker chooses p ex post, the commitment device is rejected
by a sophisticated agent who understands that she would choose p with a better
probability from the whole choice set. This condition, called No Commitment to
Inferior Lotteries, rules out pessimistic anticipations. The second axiom, Com-
mitment to Superior Lotteries, rules out optimistic expectations: if  > fp;qg(p),
a sophisticated decision-maker accepts the commitment device. The main result
of section 3 is that extensions of these axioms to larger menus characterize so-
phistication. In contrast, naive agents never commit to inferior lotteries but fail
to seize commitment opportunities that appear protable in light of their ex post
behavior.
Another contribution of the paper is to introduce a subclass of representations,
the Unidimensional Random Strotz models, in which attention can be restricted to
menus of two elements. Section 2 denes and provides foundations for this class
of representations whose relevant deviations share a same direction but might
vary in intensity. This refers to situations where deviations occur for a unique
reason, but where the intensity of preference reversals is unknown ex ante. Since
most experimental settings are likely to belong to this class, assessing naivete and
sophistication is easily done by varying  and observing the choices between menus
of the form fp; qg and fp+ (1  )qg.
Comparing commitment choices with ex post behavior identies the degree
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to which the decision-maker's ex ante anticipations are naive. The subjective
expectation regarding fp;qg(p) can be identied as the threshold  that makes the
decision-maker indierent between fp; qg and fp + (1   )qg. Comparing this
value with fp;qg(p) reveals whether the agent is sophisticated, naive or pessimistic,
and in these latter cases to which degree. Section 3 denes a local measure of
naivete that represents, for each menu, the rst-order stochastic distance between
the ex ante and ex post beliefs regarding the choices made inside the menu. This
index is intuitively related to properties of the joint representations: xing the ex
post behavior, a uniform increase in the index of naivete is equivalent to a rst-
order stochastic downward shift in ex ante beliefs about the intensity of deviation,
and, equivalently, to a lower demand for commitment. Fixing the preferences
over menus, a (uniform) increase in the index of naivete is equivalent to a rst-
order stochastic upward shift in ex post realized deviations and, equivalently, to
a higher propensity to make ex post choices that are suboptimal from the ex ante
perspective.
A possible caveat to this analysis is that the Random Strotz model is an ar-
bitrary interpretation of commitment choices: indeed, there exist other represen-
tations of preferences over menus that are consistent with the same behavior, but
that suggest a dierent system of beliefs. A false interpretation of the agent's
cognitive process and preferences is thus a potential confound, since it could lead
to reject the sophistication hypothesis by mistake. As a robustness check, section
4 analyzes sophistication and naivete under the other prominent model of menu
choices, the Random Gul-Pesendorfer representation (Stovall, 2010). Under some
restrictions, this model is observationally equivalent to the Random Strotz model
for the preference over menus (Dekel and Lipman, 2012), but the ex post choices
that it suggests are dierent. The most important dierence is that the Ran-
dom Gul-Pesendorfer model incorporates decision costs than cannot be observed
ex post : a decision-maker might be willing to remove an option from a choice set
even if this option is never chosen, as soon as its presence is unpleasant enough to
inict a decision cost. Unsurprisingly, choices that appear naive under the Ran-
dom Strotz model are also naive under any equivalent Random Gul-Pesendorfer
representations: adding ex ante menu-contingent decision costs cannot rationalize
overcondent commitment choices. However, choices that appear pessimistic in
the Random Strotz interpretation might be rationalized by a model incorporating
decision costs, as is shown in section 4.
Finally, section 5 reports the results of an experimental design based on the
theoretical results. While the main application of the setting relates to temptation
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and self-control issues, the Random Strotz model is silent about the source of
preference reversals. The experimental protocol relies on this property and focuses
on naivete about future memory failures. Participants have the possibility to
earn a monetary prize p every day within a ten days period if they remember
to log in to an experimental website during the day. They earn nothing (q) if
they forget to do so. Prior to this ten days session, their indierence threshold 
between this procedure and a payment rule that delivers the prize with probability
 is elicited. This latter choice can be interpreted as the commitment device
fp + (1   )qg. Comparing  with the actual frequency of visiting the website
over the ten days session provides a precise measure of the dierence between ex
ante expectations and ex post choices. I nd that 66% of participants make naive
choices, while 22% make sophisticated choices and only 12% display pessimistic
expectations. The results show that considering stochastic choice substantially
renes our measurements, and a lot of information would be lost by considering
only perfectly sophisticated and completely naive decision-makers.
This work builds on the literature on menu choices, started by Kreps (1979)
and pursued by Dekel et al. (2001). This eld is interested in nding represen-
tations for preferences over menus that are interpretable in terms of anticipation
of future subjective tastes. Applications usually include preference for exibility,
reected in a taste for larger menus, or the role of temptation, which leads the
agent to prefer smaller choice sets (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001; Noor, 2007; Stovall,
2010; Dekel and Lipman, 2012; Kopylov, 2012; Kopylov and Noor, 2015; Noor and
Takeoka, 2010). However, this literature is silent about the actual choice inside
menus, which is usually left unmodeled, and it assumes that anticipations correctly
predict future behavior. For instance, Dekel and Lipman (2012) show that, while
the Random Strotz and Random Gul-Pesendorfer representations of choices over
menus are equivalent, the ex post behaviors that they predict are dierent. As a
result, observing ex post choices and assuming sophistication allows to separate
them. In contrast, relaxing the sophistication hypothesis and allowing for incorrect
anticipations breaks the identication: a naive Random Strotz model cannot be
disentangled from a naive Random Gul-Pesendorfer model. Consequently, results
that are robust to both specications are useful since they do not require to take
a stand on which model is the most accurate representation of behavior.
The rst paper to explicitly model choice inside menus, and to provide tools
to compare anticipations and realization of tastes, is the work by Ahn and Sarver
(2013). They study the correspondence between ex ante and ex post subjective
tastes in the particular case where the agent values exibility. They use the Dekel
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et al. (2001) framework with a monotonicity assumption, in which the normative
utility is uncertain ex ante, and aligned with the decision utility ex post. Their
analysis shows that two axioms, Consequentialism and Foreseen Contingencies, are
necessary and sucient conditions for a joint sophisticated representation1. The
contribution of this paper is to perform the same exercise under the assumption
that the decision-maker values commitment instead of exibility, which is suited
to the analysis of sophistication and naivete in the context of preference reversals.
Variants of Consequentialism and Foreseen Contingencies are necessary but not
sucient in the Random Strotz model, as explained in section 3. Finally, Ahn et al.
(2015) study a related setting in a recent paper conceived independently from this
work. They propose dierent absolute and comparative notions of naivete, as well
as an application to intertemporal discounting models, while the theoretical results
in this paper are more oriented towards testable behavioral properties.
2 Primitives
2.1 Objects of choice
Consider a nite set of prizes Z, and (Z) the set of all probability distri-
butions on Z, written p; q; ::: and called lotteries. (Z) is endowed with the
Euclidian topology, each element of (Z) being identied with a vector of RjZj.
X is the set of nite non-empty subsets of Z, and elements of X are written x; y; :::
and called menus. X is endowed with the Hausdor topology.
Let U be the set of all expected utilities on Z. An element of U can be identied
with a vector of RjZj. Consider the subset W containing all elements u of U that
verify
P
u(z) = 0 and
P
u(z)2 = 1. Each nonconstant expected utility can be
identied with a unique element u of W .
The behavior of a decision-maker is observed in two periods. At the ex ante
stage, the agent has preferences over menus, as in Kreps (1979). A menu contains
the options that will be available to the decision-maker in the future. This choice
is described by a preference relation  dened on X , x  y meaning that the
agent prefers to choose inside the menu x rather than in y at the later period. As
usual,  denotes the asymmetric part of . At the ex post stage, the agent picks
one element in the set. Her choice process is modeled as a random choice rule, i.e.
as a function  : X ! ((Z)) such that x(x) = 1 for any menu x 2 X . If y is
a subset of a menu x, x(y) represents the probability with which an object in y
1Dean and McNeill (2015) nd some support for these axioms experimentally.
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is picked when the agent chooses in x. To lighten the notation, x(fpg) is simply
written x(p). (; ) is our primitive.
To dene sophistication and naivete in this setting, we need to put more struc-
ture into these objects in order to introduce anticipated and actual taste contin-
gencies. This section describes the representations chosen to model  and .
2.2 Random Strotz
Preferences over menus are represented by a Random Strotz model (Dekel and
Lipman, 2012).
Denition 2.1. The preference relation  admits a Random Strotz representation
if there exists a pair (u; ) where u 2 W is a nontrivial expected utility and  is
a nontrivial probability distribution on W such that  is represented by
V (x) =
Z
W
(dw) max
p2Mw(x)
u(p) (2.1)
where Mw(x) = fp 2 xj8q 2 x;w(p)  w(q)g is the set of maximizers of w in x.
Dekel and Lipman (2012) show that the pair (u; ) that represents  is unique.
To understand this representation, suppose rst that the support of  is a singleton
w. The valuation of a menu x is equal to u(p), where p is the lottery that maximizes
w in x (with ties broken in favor of u). This suggests that the agent has long-
term preferences given by u at the ex ante stage but anticipates that her choice
inside menus will maximize w instead. The decision-maker displays a preference
for commitment as soon as w diers from u, and does not value exibility since the
normative preference u is certain. The representation 2.1 adds some uncertainty
about the future decision utility, keeping the normative preferences certain. The
utility u is referred to as the commitment utility since it represents the preference
over singleton menus.
2.3 Random Expected Utility
The stochastic choice made by the agent inside menus is modeled by a Random
Expected Utility representation, as axiomatized by Gul and Pesendorfer (2006).
This model represents  as the result of the maximization of a stochastic utility
v drawn from W according to a measure  that represents the distribution of ex
post preferences.
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A well-known issue that arises in random utility models is that a particular w
selected among the possible decision utilities might admit multiple maximizers in
the choice set. In that case, the choice prescribed by w is ambiguous. To overcome
this issue, I follow Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) and Ahn and Sarver (2013) and
assume that indierence is resolved according to a tie-breaking procedure.
Let BW be the Borel -algebra on W and f (W) denote the set of all nitely
additive probability measures over (W ;BW). A tie-breaking rule species, for each
w 2 W , how the choice is made in the case where w has multiple maximizers in
the choice set.
Denition 2.2. A tie-breaking rule is a function  :W ! f (W) such that, for
all x 2 A and p 2 x :
w(fv 2 Wj8q 2 x n fpg; v(p) > v(q)g) = w(fv 2 Wjv(p) = max
q2x
v(q)g)
Among the set of maximizers of w in a menu x, a lottery p is chosen if the
tie-breaker w chooses an expected utility v 2 W such that p maximizes v among
the maximizers of w. Hence, to be selected an element must survive a two-stage
procedure: rst being a maximizer of w, second being a maximizer of v among the
remaining lotteries, v being chosen according to the distribution w. Denition 2.2
ensures that this second comparison resolves the indierence.
Denition 2.3.  has a Random Expected Utility representation if there exists a
measure  on W and a tie-breaking rule  on W such that, for y  x,
x(y) =
Z
w2W
w(fv 2 WjMv(Mw(x)) 2 yg)d(w)
The measure  is dened over the set of expected utilitiesW , and x(y) equals
the probability with which the outcome of the two-stages process described above
belongs to y. This representation suggests that an expected utility w is drawn
according to the measure , and that the agent's choice maximizes this realized
preference.
Since the Random Strotz representation implicitly assumes that ties are broken
in favor of u, we restrict attention to Random Expected Utility that also satisfy
this property: if p 2 Mw(x) but p /2 Mu(Mw(x)), p is chosen with probability
zero by the tie-breaking rule.
Assumption 1. 8x 2 A; w 2 W ; w(fv 2 WjMv(Mw(x)) 6 Mu(Mw(x))g) = 0.
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An alternative possibility would be to include this property in the denition of
sophistication. This would introduce some cumbersome notation but the axioms
and the results would be unchanged. Assumption 1 is therefore maintained for the
sake of simplicity, which allows to restrict attention to the comparison between 
and  and to avoid discussing the presence of multiple maximizers.
2.4 Sophistication and naivete
2.4.1 Partial order on W
Given those primitives, we are interested in comparing the metacognitive pro-
cess of the agent, reected in , with the actual realization of tastes, reected in .
Dening sophistication is straightforward: a sophisticated agent has exactly the
right model in mind ex ante when she contemplates her future choices, which is
equivalent to the equality  = . Dening naivete, in contrast, requires to capture
the fact that the decision-maker systematically underestimates the strength of her
future deviations. To give content to this notion, I build on Dekel and Lipman
(2012) to dene a notion of intensity of future temptations.
Denition 2.4. Dene the order u on W by
w1 u w2 if u(p) > u(q); w2(p)  w2(q)) w1(p)  w1(q)
The relation w1 u w2 (to be read as "w1 is closer to u than w2") means that
w1 prescribes the same choice as u among pairs of lotteries at least as often as w2.
Denition 2.5. Consider a Random Strotz representation (u; ) and a Random
Expected Utility representation (; ). (i) (u; ; ; ) is sophisticated if  = ; (ii)
(u; ; ; ) is naive if for any w 2 W , (f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg)  (f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg)
with strict inequality for some w.
The denition of naivete applies a notion of rst-order stochastic dominance
along the order u: it says that ex ante beliefs systematically overestimate the
probability with which ex post choices agree with the long-term preference u.
2.4.2 Continuous-intensity Random Strotz model
This subsection provides conditions under which the measure  admits an
intuitive decomposition. Let V = fv 2 W ; u:v = 0g. Basic linear algebra results
show that any element ofWnfu; ug can be written under the form au+p1  a2v,
where v 2 V and a 2 ( 1; 1), a and v being unique.
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The following result, due to Dekel and Lipman (2012), characterizes the sets
of utility functions that are closed under u.
Lemma 1. w1 u w2 if and only if there exists v 2 V and coecients a1  a2
such that w1 = a1u+
p
1  a21v and w2 = a2u+
p
1  a22v.
Hence, xing v 2 V , the set fau +p1  a2v; a 2 [ 1; 1])g can be completely
ordered according to u, the ranking being given by the coecients a. Conversely,
two elements of W can be ranked if and only if they belong to such a set. If
w = au+
p
1  a2v, v denotes the direction of the temptation w, while a measures
its intensity (higher values of a correspond to a lower intensity).
Given u, for any v 2 V we write Cv = fau +
p
1  a2v; a 2 ( 1; 1)g, and
Cv = Cv [ fu; ug the closure of Cv.
The set W can be written W = Sv2V Cv. Each set Cv identies the direction
of temptation v, and can be considered as a line parameterized by the intensity of
temptation in that direction. I impose two additional conditions on : continuity
of the representation and niteness of the set of relevant directions. Dekel and
Lipman (2012) show that these properties characterize the subclass of Random
Strotz models that satisfy Stovall (2010)'s axioms.
Denition 2.6. (u; ) is a nite continuous-intensity Random Strotz represen-
tation if: (i) there exists a collection of lower semi-continuous densities fvgv2V
dened over [ 1; 1] such that for any measurable E, we have
(E) =
Z
v2V
v(fa 2 [ 1; 1]jau+
p
1  a2v 2 Eg)V(dv)
(ii) There exists a nite collection F  V such that (Sv2F Cv) = 1.
2.5 Unidimensional setting
A unidimensional setting is a particular case of a Random Strotz model in
which fv 2 Vj(Cv) > 0g is a singleton. This refers to a situation where the agent
knows the (unique) nature of her temptation but might be uncertain about its
strength. This case plays a particular role in the subsequent analysis, since the
behavioral axioms will take an appealing and intuitive form in a unidimensional
model. This section provides a characterization of this property.
Denition 2.7. A Random Strotz representation (u; ) is unidimensional if there
exists v 2 V such that (Cv) = 1.
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Axiom 2.1 (Ordered Temptations).
If fpg  fq1g  fq2g for any p 2 x[y, then x[fq1g  x[fq2g ) y[fq1g  y[fq2g
Axiom 2.1 means that any pair of normatively equivalent temptations fq1; q2g
can be ranked in terms of their desirability ex post independently of the menu on
which they exert a temptation. Intuitively, this corresponds to a situation where
all temptations are appealing ex post for the same reason, which is likely to be the
case in most experimental settings. Appendix B contains a proof of the following
representation theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Suppose that  has a Random Strotz representation (u; ). (u; )
is unidimensional if and only if  satises axiom 2.1.
Example To highlight the behavioral content of axiom 2.1, I provide here an
example where it is violated. Suppose that a decision-maker has the option to
commit to a schedule for her next working day, splitting her time into three activi-
ties: working, exercising and leisure. She anticipates two subjective states: one in
which she is lazy to work (but enjoys exercising), and one in which she is lazy to
exercise (but enjoys working). Denoting (a; b) an option that consists in working
a hours and exercising during b hours, she might display the following preferences:
 According to the long-term preference, (9; 1)  (5; 2)  (5; 0)  (5; 1).
 In state 1, (5; 2)  (0; 1)  (9; 1)  (5; 0): the agent enjoys exercising but
dislikes working. She maximizes the number of hours spent exercising, and
then minimizes the number of hours spent working among the remaining
options.
 In state 2, (9; 1)  (5; 0)  (5; 2)  (0; 1): the agent enjoys working but
dislikes exercising, and has lexicographic preferences that mirror state 1.
Her preferences satisfy f(9; 1)g  f(9; 1); (0; 1)g but f(9; 1)g  f(9; 1); (5; 0)g
since (5; 0) is never chosen against (9; 1). Similarly, f(5; 2)g  f(5; 2); (5; 0)g but
f(5; 2)g  f(5; 2); (0; 1)g. These conditions together violate axiom 2.1. Intuitively,
(5; 0) is tempting with respect to (5; 2) because of the laziness to exercise in state
2, while (0; 1) is tempting with respect to (9; 1) because of the laziness to work in
state 1.
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3 Naivete in the Random Strotz model
3.1 Representation result
Consider a lottery p and a menu y such that fpg  fq1g  fq2g for all q1; q2 2 y.
All the options in y have the same ex ante valuation and p is strictly preferred
to any of them. The decision-maker's ex ante valuation associated with the menu
y [ fpg depends on her subjective probability of choosing fpg or an element of y.
The subjective probability of choosing p equals (fw 2 Wjw(p)  maxq2y w(q)g).
Let us write it y[fpg(p). Considering any q 2 y, we have
V (y [ fpg) = y[fpg(p)u(p) + y[fpg(y)u(q) (3.1)
Consider now the singleton fp+(1 )qg, where  2 [0; 1]. Since the decision-
maker has no choice to make inside the menu, her corresponding valuation equals
V (fp+ (1  )qg) = u(p) + (1  )u(q) (3.2)
Suppose now that the decision-maker faces the choice between the whole menu,
y[fpg, and the singleton fp+(1 )qg. Comparing equations 3.1 and 3.2 shows
that her choice depends on the relative position of y[fpg(p) and : she prefers the
singleton menu as soon as  > y[fpg(p), i.e. as soon as the exogenous probability
of delivering p exceeds her anticipated probability of choosing p from the whole
menu. Varying the exogenous probability  hence identies how the decision-
maker forecasts her future choices, and this information can be compared with
her observed ex post choice y[fpg(p). Our rst axiom exploits this idea to detect
pessimistic forecasts.
Denition 3.1. The menu y is homogeneous if fpg  fqg for any p; q 2 y.
Axiom 3.1 (No Commitment to Inferior Lotteries).
If fpg  fqg, q 2 y and y is homogeneous,  < y[fpg(p) ) fp + (1   )qg 
y [ fpg
p + (1   )q is an inferior lottery as soon as  < y[fpg(p). A rational
decision-maker anticipates that fp + (1   )qg is inferior to the expected value
that she derives from the whole menu, since  is lower than her own probability
of choosing p. The fact that the decision-maker discards all inferior lotteries rules
out pessimistic expectations. This axiom is satised by sophisticated agents but
also by naive individuals who hold optimistic beliefs.
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Our second axiom complements axiom 3.1 and detects optimistic anticipations.
Axiom 3.2 (Commitment to Superior Lotteries).
If fpg  fqg, p 2 x and x is homogeneous,  > x[fqg(x) ) fp + (1   )qg 
x [ fqg
p+(1 )q is a superior lottery as soon as  > x[fqg(x). This allows to dis-
criminate between sophisticated and naive agents. A naive agent underestimates
her propensity to self-indulge ex post and fails to accept superior commitments,
misguided by the wrong belief that her ex post choice will outperform the proposed
option.
Theorem 3.1 shows that axiom 3.1 and 3.2 characterize naivete and sophisti-
cation.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that  has a nite continuous-intensity Random Strotz
representation (u; ), and that  has a Random Expected Utility representation
(; ). Then (i) (u; ; ; ) is sophisticated if and only if (; ) satises axiom
3.1 and 3.2; (ii) (u; ; ; ) is naive if and only if (; ) satises axiom 3.1 and
violates axiom 3.2.
Remark. The conditions in axioms 3.1 and 3.2 only need to be checked for menus
x and y of size K, where K is the number of relevant directions in the support of
. This property is exploited in subsection 3.4 in the unidimensional setting, i.e.
in the case where K = 1.
3.2 Discussion
3.2.1 Ex ante realism vs optimism
This subsection shows how axioms 3.1 and 3.2 relate to more immediate but
less easily testable behavioral denitions of naivete and sophistication.
Denition 3.2. Consider a menu x. f; g is: (i) realistic at x if x  fPp2x x(p)pg;
(ii) optimistic at x if x  fPp2x x(p)pg.
The lottery fPp2x x(p)pg can be interpreted as a certain equivalent of the
menu x revealed by the actual choices made by the decision-maker from x. A
realistic agent is indierent between a menu x and its certain equivalent: she
correctly anticipates that both menus deliver the same distribution over lotteries
at the consumption stage. In contrast, an optimistic agent weakly prefers any
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menu to its certain equivalent since she believes that her choices from x will be
better aligned with her ex ante preference than they actually are.
Proposition 3.1 states that realism and optimism characterize, respectively,
sophistication and naivete. Together with theorem 3.1, this result shows that an
experimenter can restrict attention to tests of the form given by axioms 3.1 and 3.2
to investigate the extent to which the decision-maker's expectations are optimistic.
Proposition 3.1. (u; ; ; ) is sophisticated if and only if (; ) is realistic at
any menu. (u; ; ; ) is naive if and only if (; ) is realistic or optimistic at any
menu (and optimistic for at least one menu).
3.2.2 Links with Ahn and Sarver (2013)
Ahn and Sarver (2013) provide a characterization of sophisticated behavior for
a decision-maker who values exibility and not commitment. They also compare
preferences over menus, and stochastic choices inside menus, and they assume that
the ex ante preference admits a Dekel et al. (2001) representation: the decision-
maker anticipates a stochastic taste contingency, described by a set of subjective
states, but in contrast to the present model there is no conict of preference be-
tween ex ante and ex post choices, which implies that larger menus are always
preferred. Ahn and Sarver (2013) prove that two conditions characterize the cor-
respondence between anticipated and actual taste contingencies. The rst one, a
variant of Consequentialism, requires that options that are never chosen ex post
are irrelevant ex ante: adding an option p to a menu x should not change the val-
uation of x if p is never chosen from x[fpg ex post. Their second axiom, Foreseen
Contingencies is the converse condition and ensures that options that are chosen
ex post are relevant in the ex ante valuation.
Variants of these axioms are also necessary to obtain sophistication in the
present model. For instance, sophistication implies
Axiom 3.3 (Consequentialism). x[fpg(p) = 0) x [ fpg  x.
Ahn and Sarver (2013) show that Consequentialism and Foreseen Contingen-
cies are necessary and sucient conditions to nd a sophisticated representation
since subjective probabilities are not unique in Dekel et al. (2001)'s framework.
In contrast, in the Random Strotz model more stringent conditions are needed to
identify the probability associated with each subjective state, which allows us to
test how the decision-maker ex ante expectations compare with her actual ex post
choices.
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3.2.3 Non-instrumental concerns
The Random Strotz model assumes that the decision-maker's preferences over
menus only reect her preferences over nal consumption goods. It therefore rules
out other phenomena that might inuence her willingness to commit. First, in-
dividuals might have intrinsic preferences over the decision process itself. People
might value the ability to make a decision themselves, irrespective of the outcomes
obtained, as shown in the experiment by Bartling et al. (2014). In contrast, other
authors postulate that making decisions is undesirable, because thinking is costly
(Ortoleva, 2013; Ergin and Sarver, 2010) or because controlling one's impulses is
unpleasant (see Baumeister et al., 2007; Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001, and section
4). Similarly, common sense suggests that self-esteem and reputation management
(Benabou and Tirole, 2004) might prevent people from choosing commitment op-
tions, since this decision reveals the existence of their self-control issues. However,
one may also argue that failures to exert self-control at the ex post stage entails
a large reputation cost, which might increase the willingness to commit. For in-
stance, Exley and Naecker (2015) report the results of a eld experiment in which
the demand for commitment is higher when the choice is made in public rather
than in private, which suggests that individuals signal something positive about
themselves by restricting their options. All in all, it is therefore unclear whether
non-instrumental concerns increase or decrease the desire to commit, and I leave
these interesting questions for future research.
3.3 Absolute and relative measures of naivete
This subsection explores some properties of naive representations, denes a
cardinal index of naivete that measures the gap between expected and realized
choices as well as two comparative notions of naivete.
3.3.1 A local index of naivete
Denition 3.3. Consider a menu x, and suppose that (; ) is realistic or opti-
mistic at x. Consider (x) the set of lotteries dened over x, and the subset of
(x) dened by
N;(x) = f 2 (x)jf
X
p2x
x(p)pg  f
X
p2x
ppg  xg
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The index of naivete of (; ) at x is the (normalized) volume of N;(x):
N;(x) =
V{ (N;(x))
V{ ((x))
A lottery  belongs to N;(x) if the agent should objectively commit to 
instead of x but naively refuses to do so. N;(x) 2 [0; 1] measures the disagree-
ment between ex ante and ex post probabilities of choice in x. N;(x) = 0 if
(; ) is realistic at x, N;(x) > 0 if (; ) is optimistic at x, and N;(x) = 1
if the decision-maker does not anticipate preference reversals but always chooses
the worst element of the set according to the ex ante preferences.
Remark. If f; g is pessimistic at x, an index of pessimism can be dened in a
similar way by reversing the inequalities in the denition.
Example Suppose that K = 2, and denote p = (1; 0) and q = (0; 1) the two
degenerate lotteries over prizes. Suppose that fpg  fp; qg. For any lotteries
z1; z2 such that z1(1) > z2(1), we write 
fz1;z2g(z1) the probability with which
the decision-maker anticipates choosing z1. We obtain 
fz1;z2g(z1) = fp;qg(p) and
fz1;z2g(z1) = fp;qg(p). Hence, N;(fz1; z2g) is constant over all pairs fz1; z2g such
that z1 6= z2, and it equals N;(fp; qg) = fp;qg(p)   fp;qg(p). It measures the
gap between the ex ante and ex post probabilities of choosing p, the normatively
superior prize, over q. N;(fp; qg) = 0 for a sophisticated agent, and N(fp; qg) =
1 at the limit when fp;qg(p) = 1 and fp;qg(p) = 0.
3.3.2 Comparative measures of naivete
This paragraph compares the accuracy of the anticipations held by two agents.
To focus on how dierences in metacognitions are related to dierences in behavior,
let us rst restrict attention to pairs of agents who have the same ex post behavior
 but whose commitment preferences 1 and 2 are dierent. We will say that
agent 1 is more naive than agent 2 if agent 1 is less willing to commit to singleton
menus than agent 2, reecting the fact that individual 2 has a greater awareness
of her tendency to being tempted.
Denition 3.4. Suppose that (1; ) and (2; ) have naive representations.
(1; ) is more naive than (2; ) if
fpg 1 x) fpg 2 x
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This denition is equivalent to Dekel and Lipman (2012)'s denition of agent 2
being more temptation-averse than agent 1. With the additional assumption that
both joint representations are naive, a higher aversion to temptation is naturally
interpreted as a greater degree of sophistication in the present case. Our next
proposition characterizes how this notion is reected in terms of representation.
A rst immediate observation is that 1 and 2 have the same preference over
singletons, which implies that u1 = u2. Moreover, as Dekel and Lipman (2012)
show, agent 2's greater demand for commitment is equivalent to the fact that the
beliefs held by agent 2 over the intensity of temptation rst-order stochastically
dominate the beliefs held by agent 1, in each direction.
These two equivalent properties can also be related to the absolute measure
of naivete dened in 3.3. If agent 1 is more naive than agent 2, then the index
of naivete of agent 1 exceeds the index of naivete of agent 2 at any menu x,
reecting the fact that individual 1 is uniformly more optimistic than individual
2. The reverse implication also holds under the assumption u1 = u2 (which is not
guaranteed by the inequality N1;(x)  N2;(x) for all x).
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that 1 has a Random Strotz representation (u1; 1),
and 2 has a Random Strotz representation (u2; 2).
The following statements are equivalent: (i) (1; ) is more naive than (2; );
(ii) u1 = u2, and 1(f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg)  2(f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg for any w 2 W.
In addition, assuming that u1 = u2, (i) and (ii) are equivalent to: (iii) for any
menu x, N1;(x)  N2;(x).
Another possibility is to compare pairs of agents who have the same ex ante
preference , but whose ex post choices might dier. We will say that agent
1 is more naive than agent 2 if agent 1 chooses the tempting options as least
as often as agent 2 does, the denition of a tempting object being given by the
common preference. Since agent 1 and agent 2 have the same beliefs ex ante, this
comparative property suggests that agent 1's beliefs over future taste contingencies
are less accurate than agent 2's perception.
Denition 3.5. Suppose that (; 1) and (; 2) have naive representations.
(; 1) is more naive than (; 2) if
fpg  fqg for all p 2 x; q 2 y ) x[y1 (x)  x[y2 (y)
Agent 1's greater tendency to self-indulge ex post is equivalent to the rst-
order stochastic dominance of the distribution of realized tastes 1 over 2 on the
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intensity scale, in each direction. These two properties are also equivalent to the
uniform ranking of N1 and N2 over all menus.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that 1 and 2 have respective Random Expected Utility
representations (1; 1) and (2; 2) and satisfy assumption 1.
The following statements are equivalent: (i) (; 1) is more naive than (; 2);
(ii) For any w 2 W ; 1(f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg)  2(f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg; (iii) for any
menu x, N;1(x)  N;2(x).
3.4 Example: a unidimensional setting
3.4.1 Measuring naivete
The previous results take a simple and intuitive form in a unidimensional frame-
work. This property is useful since, as discussed above, most experimental settings
are likely to belong to this class. Axioms 3.1 and 3.2 can be summarized by:
Axiom 3.4 (Sophistication for pairs).
If fpg  fqg,  < fp;qg(p), fp+ (1  )qg  fp; qg
If  is unidimensional, axiom 3.4 is a necessary and sucient condition for the
sophistication of the pair (; ). Hence, the experimenter can restrict attention to
pairs of lotteries instead of considering larger menus. Suppose that p and q are such
that fpg  fp; qg. Since V (fp; qg) = fp;qg(p)u(p)+fp;qg(q)u(q), the value  such
that the decision-maker is indierent between fp+(1 )qg and fp; qg identies
fp;qg(p). This value can be elicited by an adapted Becker-DeGroot-Marschak
mechanism. Comparing this threshold with fp;qg(p) reveals the nature of ex ante
beliefs at fp; qg: naive if fp;qg(p) > p;q(p), pessimistic if fp;qg(p) < p;q(p), and
sophisticated if fp;qg(p) = p;q(p).
3.4.2 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting
A particular example of a unidimensional setting is given by the (; ) frame-
work (Laibson, 1997). Consider the case where the prizes are consumption streams
over an innite horizon f0; 1;    ; t;    g. A prize c is characterized by an innite
sequence fc0;    ; ct;    g of consumption levels. Suppose that the preference over
singletons u can be represented by the standard discounted-utility model, and
each ex post taste contingency belongs to the quasi-hyperbolic discounting class,
as axiomatized by Olea and Strzalecki (2014):
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 There exists  2 [0; 1] and a function w : R ! R such that u(c) =
+1X
t=1
t 1w(ct).
 There exists a measure  : [0; 1]! R such that
V (x) =
Z 1
=0
() max
c2Mv (x)
u(c)d
where v(c) = w(c1) + 
+1X
t=1
t 1w(ct).
 There exists a measure  : [0; 1]! R and a tie-breaker  such that
8y  x; x(y) =
Z 1
=0
(f~ 2 [0; 1]jMv~(Mv(x)) 2 yg)d()
This framework is a particular case of a unidimensional setting in which 
parameterizes the intensity of temptation. The denitions and results provided
above admit the following forms:
(i) Sophistication is equivalent to the identity  = . A naive joint represen-
tation is such that  strictly dominates  at the rst-order. For instance,
if  and  are Dirac distributions respectively on ^ and , sophistication is
equivalent to ^ = , while naivete is equivalent to ^ > .
(ii) If 1 is represented by 1 and 2 by 2, (1; ) is more naive than (2; )
if 1 dominates 2. If 1 is represented by 1 and 2 by 2, (; 1) is more
naive than (; 2) if 2 dominates 1.
(iii) If fcg  fc; c0g, the index of naivete at the set fc; c0g equals ([; 1])  
([; 1]), where  is dened by v(c) = v(c0). Thus, the index of naivete
at a pair measures the distance between the cumulative distribution functions
over  measured at the switching point between the two elements of the pair.
4 Naivete in the Random Gul-Pesendorfer model
The Random Strotz model provides a possible interpretation of the behavior of
a decision-maker who values smaller menus. Nevertheless, other representations of
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the desire for commitment are conceivable. This section studies how the results of
section 3 are modied if  is rationalized by a Random Gul-Pesendorfer model2.
4.1 Random Gul-Pesendorfer model
Denition 4.1. The preference relation  admits a Random Gul-Pesendorfer
representation (Stovall, 2010) if there exists a nontrivial expected utility u, and a
nontrivial measure  on U such that  is represented by the functional
V (x) =
Z
w2U
[max
p2x
(u(p) + w(p)) max
q2x
w(q)](dw) (4.1)
If  is a degenerate lottery, this denition comes down to the Gul-Pesendorfer
model of temptation-driven preferences (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001). In the sub-
jective state w, the decision-maker trades o her long-term preference u against
her short-term temptation w, choosing the element that maximizes u+w in x, and
incurring a self-control cost equal to maxq2xw(q). In contrast with the Random
Strotz model, a tempting option can lower the ex ante valuation of a menu even if
it is never chosen, provided that its presence in the menu inicts a self-control cost
to the decision-maker. Equation 4.1 adds some uncertainty by considering that
temptations are drawn according to a measure  (Stovall, 2010). In contrast to
the Random Strotz representation, the Random Gul-Pesendorfer functional does
not identify : several functions of the form of equation 4.1 can rationalize the
same preference (see Dekel and Lipman, 2012).
A notion of unidimensionality can be dened analogously to the Random Strotz
model. The representation (u; ) is unidimensional if there exists v 2 U such that
u:v = 0 and the support of  is included in fu+v;   0g. Notice that denition
4.1 does not impose any normalization condition on u nor on the temptations v.
This explains why  is dened over U and not W and why the equivalence classes
of u now take the form fu+ v;   0g.
4.2 Naivete
Dening naivete associated with a preference  requires a more robust deni-
tion than in section 3 to deal with the non-uniqueness of the representation. A set
of equivalent Random Gul-Pesendorfer representations is classied as naive with
2Dekel and Lipman (2012) show that any preference with a Random Gul-Pesendorfer repre-
sentation also admits a continuous-intensity Random Strotz representation, and vice versa.
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respect to some ex post preference if all the representations belonging to this set
are naive.
Denition 4.2. Consider a Random Gul-Pesendorfer representation (u; ) and
a Random Expected Utility representation (; ). (u; ; ; ) is naive if for any
~w 2 U , (fw 2 Uj(u + w) u ~wg)  (fw 2 Ujw u ~wg). Consider a set E
of equivalent Random Gul-Pesendorfer models. (E ; ; ) is naive if for any (u; )
belonging to E , (u; ; ; ) is naive.
Theorem 4.1 is adapted from Dekel and Lipman (2012) and states that the
Random Strotz representation of a preference  is less pessimistic about the in-
tensity of future temptations than any of its equivalent Random Gul-Pesendorfer
representations.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that the preference  admits a Random Strotz represen-
tation (u; ) and a Random Gul-Pesendorfer (u; ). For any ~w 2 W
(fw 2 Wjw u ~wg)  (fw 2 Uj(u+ w) u ~wg)
As a consequence, if (u; ; ; ) is naive then the set of Random-Gul Pesendorfer
models E associated with  is such that (E ; ; ) is naive. The same conclusion
holds if (u; ; ; ) is sophisticated and  is temptation-averse.
An immediate implication is that the degree of naivete of a naive Random
Strotz model is a lower bound of the degree of naivete of all corresponding Ran-
dom Gul-Pesendorfer models. Intuitively, anticipating self-control costs ex ante
reinforces the desire to commit; therefore commitment choices that appear too
optimistic in light of ex post choices cannot be rationalized by assuming that the
decison-maker was expecting decision costs. If the behavior of a decision-maker
satises axiom 3.1 and violates axiom 3.2, theorem 4.1 shows that this nding
is sucient to conclude that all Random Gul-Pesendorfer representations of her
behavior are also identied as naive. In that case, the Random Strotz interpre-
tation of behavior is the conservative hypothesis regarding the degree of naivete
attributed to the agent's behavior. In addition, Dekel and Lipman (2012) show
that, except in the trivial case where temptation is not a concern, the Random
Strotz model prescribes choices that are strictly more aligned with the long-term
preference than any of its equivalent Random Gul-Pesendorfer models. Therefore,
a pattern of choice that is sophisticated under the Random Strotz model cannot
be rationalized by a Random Gul-Pesendorfer representation.
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4.3 Sophistication
Suppose now that the observed choices satisfy axiom 3.2 and violate 3.1, in
which case the Random Strotz representation is classied as pessimistic. This
subsection studies under which conditions it is possible to rationalize the joint
preferences by a Random Gul-Pesendorfer model of commitment preferences con-
sistent with the hypothesis of sophistication. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict
attention to the simplest possible setting with only two goods. I assume that  and
 have nite support3 written fvsgs2S and fw0sgs02S0 . Since only two subjective
states are possible,  is simply characterized by two values (fug) and (f ug)
and two tie-breakers u and  u.
The denition of sophistication must be adapted to take into account the lack of
normalization in equation 4.1: a sophisticated joint representation associates any
ex ante subjective state with a unique ex post taste contingency that represents
the same preference and occurs with the same probability.
Denition 4.3. Consider a nite Random Gul-Pesendorfer representation (u; fs; vsgs2S)
and a nite Random Expected Utility representation fs0 ; ws0 ; s0gs02S0 . The pair
((u; fs; vsg); fs0 ; ws0 ; s0g) is sophisticated if there exists a bijection  : S ! S 0
such that for any s, s = (s) and u+ vs and w(s) represent the same preference.
As discussed above, consequentialism is not implied by sophistication, but an
asymmetric version of this axiom is necessary. Axiom 4.1 states that options that
are normatively preferred and chosen with positive probability are valued at the ex
ante stage. It rules out the extreme pessimism of a decision-maker who incorrectly
believes that she never chooses the normatively superior option ex post.
Axiom 4.1 (Uphill Consequentialism). If fpg  fqg and fp;qg(p) > 0, then
fp; qg  fqg.
Provided that (; ) satises axiom 3.2, axioms 4.1 is the only revealed pref-
erence implication of sophistication. Proposition 4.1 states that any intermediate
level of ex ante pessimism can be attributed to the presence of self-control costs
that are not observed ex post.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that jZj = 2, that  admits a nite Random Gul-
Pesendorfer representation and that  admits a nite Random Expected Utility.
(; ) admits a sophisticated Random Strotz or Random Gul-Pesendorfer repre-
sentation if and only if (; ) satises axioms 3.2 and 4.1.
3These properties are axiomatized in Stovall (2010) and Ahn and Sarver (2013) respectively.
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Consider a simple experiment with two goods p and q. Suppose that the exper-
imenter elicits the indierence threshold fp;qg(p) and the actual choice probabil-
ity fp;qg(p) of a subject. As gure 1 shows, four cases arise: (i) if fp;qg(p) =
fp;qg(p), the joint behavior is rationalizable by a Random Strotz model; (ii)
if fp;qg(p) > fp;qg(p), the choices are naive under any interpretation; (iii) if
0 < fp;qg(p) < fp;qg(p), the joint preferences can be rationalized by a Random
Gul-Pesendorfer interpretation; (iv) if fp;qg(p) = 0, every interpretation concludes
that the subject has pessimistic beliefs. In general, pessimism is therefore almost
impossible to detect, and a representation that includes unobservable self-control
costs can rationalize virtually any pattern of choice that would be considered as
pessimistic under the consequential interpretation of commitment choices.
t
fp;qg(p)
b
fp;qg(p)
Rationalizable
Random Gul-Pesendorfer
NaivePessimistic Sophisticated
Random Strotz
Figure 1: Classication of behavior in the two-goods case
5 Experiment
This section describes an experimental design that builds on the theoretical
analysis to elicit naivete at the individual level. The experimental procedure in-
volves a task where preference reversals are not due to temptation but to memory
failures.
5.1 Experimental procedure
5.1.1 Task
Participants have the choice between earning a monetary prize p = "X dollars"
or earning nothing, q = "0 dollars". Preference reversals do not arise because
subjects value p and q dierently at dierent points in time, since we can expect
them to always rank p above q. However, the ex post choice between p and q
is made in the future and participants receive the prize p if they make an active
choice at a given date, otherwise they receive the default q. A subject who forgets
to claim the monetary prize p therefore behaves as if she ranked q above p at the
time of the choice.
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At the initial stage of the experiment, subjects are oered the choice between
the whole choice set fp; qg or a commitment device of the form fp + (1   )qg,
where  takes values from 0 to 1. It is reasonable to expect participants to exhibit
the following preferences:
fpg  fp; qg  fqg (5.2)
The commitment device fpg always delivers the monetary prize, while the sin-
gleton fqg delivers zero dollars with certainty. In between, the decision-maker's
valuation of the choice set fp; qg depends on her subjective probability of re-
membering to claim p in the future. Equation 5.2 shows that, while self-control
problems and memory issues correspond to dierent psychological phenomena, the
Random Strotz interpretation of behavior is equally suitable to both situations.
The experimental test consists in eliciting for each participant the value (p; q)
such that fp; qg and f(p; q)p + (1   (p; q))qg are valued similarly at the ini-
tial stage. (p; q) is interpreted as the participant's subjective probability of
remembering to claim the prize p at the ex post stage. Comparing (p; q) with
fp;qg(p), the participant's actual probability of remembering to choose the mon-
etary reward, identies whether the subject behaves in a sophisticated, naive or
pessimistic manner.
5.1.2 Recruitment and instructions
Subjects were recruited on Mechanical Turk, an online labor platform where
individuals perform Human Intelligence Tasks on their personal computer in ex-
change of monetary rewards. Requesters can propose tasks with a xed payment
and award bonuses depending on the quality of the worker's answers. The identity
of the workers is entirely anonymous, since they are identied with a personal ID
given by the website.
The lack of control over the conditions in which the subjects answer the ques-
tions might be problematic to interpret the data. For this reason, participants
were asked two questions aimed at verifying their understanding of the protocol.
Correctly answering both questions was necessary to receive the baseline partic-
ipation fee and to be allowed to proceed with the experiment. Overall, 95% of
participants correctly answered both questions, suggesting that understanding is-
sues represent a minor problem. Recent research using Mechanical Turk has shown
that the quality of answers gathered on online labor markets is not signicantly
dierent from traditional laboratory experiments (Horton et al., 2011).
The task was described to the workers as an economics experiment on inter-
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temporal decision-making. Workers who chose to participate received a link to an
external website containing the experimental instructions and the answer forms.
Participants were identied by means of their Mechanical Turk ID and received a
personal code randomly generated to validate their participation on the Mechanical
Turk platform. All payments were made on the platform by the intermediary of
Amazon services.
Initial session After providing informed consent, participants were informed
that they would have the opportunity to earn a monetary reward every day dur-
ing 10 consecutive days. Each session consisted in a 24 hours-slot during which
subjects had the possibility to add the monetary prize p to their earnings by
simply signing in the experimental website with their Mechanical Turk identier.
Participants were informed that they would not receive any reminder from the
experimenter, and nothing was said about the use of articial devices. They were
invited to write down the URL of the website. They also had the possibility to
contact the experimenter at any moment through the Mechanical Turk platform
to ask for the URL.
Commitment choices Subjects were oered the possibility to modify the pay-
ment rules for one of the ten sessions, the other nine sessions remaining unchanged.
They were asked to report their preference between: (i) choosing later, that is re-
ceiving the prize only conditional on signing in; (ii) being paid with probability
, irrespective of their behavior that day. The parameter  took 21 values for all
the multiples of 5 from 0% to 100%. For each of these values, the participant had
to choose between options (i) and (ii). One of these rows was randomly selected
and the corresponding choice was implemented, thereby ensuring the incentive-
compatibility of the elicitation method (Azrieli et al., 2015).
The date at which the commitment choice was relevant was selected randomly
among the 10 possible session dates, and participants did not learn which date had
been chosen until the corresponding day. This procedure eliminates the eect of
any private information that subjects might have regarding the evolution of their
probability of remembering over time: for instance, a sophisticated participant
who always remembers to log in to the website on the rst day, but who always
forgets to do so after that, would strictly prefer fp; qg to f0:95p + 0:05qg if this
choice were implemented on the rst day, even though her actual frequency of visit
across all sessions only equals 10%. Implementing the payment rule at a random
date makes sure that the participants should report their subjective probability of
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remembering to choose p across the 10 sessions, which is the value that is estimated
from their subsequent behavior.
Attention questions and simple checks Before submitting their choices, par-
ticipants were required to answer two basic questions to verify that they read and
understood the instructions. Questions were based on hypothetical scenarios: par-
ticipants were asked how much they would earn depending on the row selected,
their choice between the two menus, and their behavior that day. Subjects were
informed that any wrong or missing answer would prevent them from proceeding
with the experiment. In contrast, subjects who provided correct answers received
the baseline participation fee and were allowed to proceed with the 10 regular
sessions.
A simple test of understanding and rationality can also be performed by
observing the commitment choices: as  goes down, each participant should
have at most one switching point from fp + (1   )qg to fp; qg. For each
participant who satises this criterion, we record the values (; ) such that
fp + (1   )qg  fp; qg  fp + (1   )qg: the subjective belief of the agent is
partially identied in the interval [; ].
Regular sessions The 10 regular sessions took place on the 10 days that fol-
lowed the initial stage. If a participant signed in to the website during a session, a
conrmation message displayed: her earnings for the session, explaining the out-
come of the payment rule if it was implemented that day; her total earnings so far;
the dates of the remaining sessions. For each of the 10 sessions, a dummy variable
records the agent's behavior, and takes value 1 if she logged in during the session
and 0 otherwise. The sum of these 10 variables  yields the actual frequency with
which the subject remembered to participate in the session.
Payment The baseline participation fee of $1 was paid in the 12 hours that
followed the initial session. In one condition, the monetary prize was equal to
$0.25; in the other treatment, it was equal to $0.4. These values might appear
very small, but they yield approximate hourly wages of respectively $14 and $20
dollars ($3.5 or $5 for 15 minutes of participation in total) for a subject who
would pass the initial test and log in to the website every day. This amount is
substantially higher than wages usually proposed on the platform ($1.38 per hour
as reported by Mason and Suri (2012)).
The earnings corresponding to the 10 regular sessions were paid the day after
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the last session under the form of a bonus on the Mechanical Turk platform. Daily
payments were not provided regularly because participants who had forgotten
about a session would have receive a payment if their commitment choice had
been successful, which would have played the role of a reminder.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 Sample
A total of 143 subjects participated in the initial stage of the experiment in June
2015. 7 participants failed the attention tests and were not allowed to proceed. In
addition, 3 participants provided multiple switch points and are excluded from the
analysis. The nal sample includes 133 participants. Average earnings amount to
$2.73 per person including the participation fee.
5.2.2 Raw data
This subsection provides some preliminary data comparing commitment choices
with frequencies of visit.
Aggregate level The average anticipated probability of remembering to visit
the website lies in the range 0.84-0.88 (std=0.20), compared with an average fre-
quency of visit of 0.47 (std=0.45) averaged across participants and sessions. The
distributions of ex ante and ex post probabilities are displayed in gure 2.
0:2
0:4
0:6
0:8
1:0
0 0:1 0:2 0:3 0:4 0:5 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9 1:0
Anticipated probabilities Actual probabilities
Figure 2: Distributions of anticipated and actual probabilities of visit
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Individual level Each participant is characterized by a set of admissible ex
ante beliefs [; ] and a frequency of visit . A subject's choices are classied as:
naive if  > ; pessimistic if  < ; sophisticated otherwise. Table 1 reports
the number and the fraction of participants in each category as a function of the
payment. Overall, 66% of the subjects made naive choices, 22% made sophisticated
decisions while 12% only choose inferior commitment devices. Among the subjects
who made sophisticated choices, 79% exhibited extreme values of  ( = 0 or
 = 1) and correctly anticipated this.
Naive choices Sophisticated
choices
Pessimistic
choices
Total
p = $0:25
24 6 5
35
(0.69) (0.17) (0.14)
p = $0:4
64 23 11
98
(0.65) (0.23) (0.11)
Total
88 29 16
133
(0.66) (0.22) (0.12)
Table 1: Number of choices per category
(in parentheses, the fraction per category)
Measure of naivete The individual index of naivete equals    if the indi-
vidual is naive. The average index among agents who made naive choices equals
0.62 (std=0.35), which means that these subjects on average overestimated by 62
percentage points their probability of visiting the website. This overcondence
has substantial economic consequences: the probability of receiving the prize for
agents with similar memory issues but who would make the right ex ante decisions
is 25 percentage points higher.
5.2.3 Statistical procedure
Independent events To provide a more elaborate elicitation of naivete, I rst
assume that participants view their future choices during the 10 sessions as in-
dependent variables drawn from the same distribution: they believe that their
probability of visiting the website at any given day is independent of the day and
of their behavior so far. In that case, the 10 dummy variables are independent
realizations of a Bernoulli random variable. If the individual made a naive choice,
the null hypothesis is that the parameter of the Bernoulli distribution equals . A
one-tailed binomial test consists in computing the probability with which, under
this null hypothesis of sophistication, the decision-maker's frequency of choosing p
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H0 rejected
(naivete)
H0 not rejected H0 rejected
(pessimism)
Total
p = $0:25
19 13 3
35
(0.54) (0.34) (0.11)
p = $0:4
46 50 2
98
(0.47) (0.51) (0.02)
Total
65 63 5
133
(0.49) (0.47) (0.05)
Table 2: Test at the individual level
(in parentheses, the fraction per category)
is smaller than or equal to . Similarly, for an individual who made a pessimistic
choice, the test consists in computing the probability with which, under the null
hypothesis of correct beliefs equal to , the individual visits the website with a
frequency greater than or equal to .
The results of the test are reported in table 2. Overall, the data rules out
sophistication for a large fraction of agents: at the 1% signicance level, the hy-
pothesis is rejected for 65 optimistic agents (49% of the sample).
Correlated events A possible caveat with the above test is that the 10 sessions
might not appear independent to the participants. For instance, a decision-maker
might believe that she will either participate to all sessions or forget entirely about
the experiment, both events happening with the same probability. In that case,
her ex ante subjective probability of visiting the website at a random date equals
0.5, but she would half of the time exhibit  = 0 and make a naive choice.
This issue brings the general problem of estimating individual choice probabili-
ties, which requires to observe a subject making repeated decisions, in which case
interdependencies between choices are likely to create confounds.
If the hypothesis of independent events is relaxed, nothing can be said at the
individual level except for extreme values of (; ) and : for instance, choices
given by fpg  fp; qg and  = 0 indicate naive anticipations, but this pattern
of choice only represents 13% of the data (17 participants). However, an aggre-
gate test can be performed by observing the proportion of agents who made naive
choices in the population. To obtain a conservative estimate for the proportion
of naive subjects, I assume that all agents who made a sophisticated or a pes-
simistic choice are not naive. For each individual who made a naive choice that
can be rationalized by a correlated beliefs structure, I compute the beliefs that
rationalizes her joint behavior and that maximizes the probability with which she
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makes choices that appear naive ex post. According to this procedure, each sub-
ject is characterized by a probability of making naive, sophisticated or pessimistic
choices: for instance, the individual described above exhibits  = 0 half of the
time (naive choice) and  = 1 half of the time (pessimistic choice). More pre-
cisely, for each individual such that  <  I assume that her ex ante beliefs are
given by
P( = 1) =
  
1   and P( = 
) =
1  
1  
This beliefs structure yields a subjective probability of visit equal to  and a
positive probability of signing in with frequency . It also suggests that the
individual makes a naive choice with probability 1 
1  and a pessimistic choice
with probability  

1  .
Under the hypothesis of sophistication, each individual is characterized by a
probability of displaying a naive joint behavior. The number of naive choices in
the population follows a Poisson-Binomial distribution whose vector of parameters
is given by the individual probabilities. Given the number of naive choices in the
data (88 out of 133), all hypotheses of the form "x% of the population is naive"
are rejected at the 1% signicance level for any x lower than 56%. These results
suggest a large prevalence of naive anticipations in the population.
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Appendix A: proofs of section 3 and 4
Notation
In the following, we denote by 1 = (
1
jZj ; :::;
1
jZ j) the (scaled) unit vector. For
any subset (a; b) of [ 1; 1] and any v 2 V , we write Cv(a; b) = fcu+
p
1  c2vja <
c < bg and Cv(a; b) = fcu +
p
1  c2vja  c  bg. Let us also dene C(a; b) =S
v2V Cv(a; b) and C(a; b) =
S
v2V Cv(a; b).
In all this section,  has a nite continuous Random Strotz representation
(u; ) and  has a Random Expected Utility representation (; ). In addition,
assumption 1 is satised.
1 Proof of theorem 3.1
1.1 Preliminary results
Lemma A.2. (; ) satises axiom 3.1 if and only if for any w 2 W,
(f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg)  (f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg).
Proof. Let us start with the "if" part. Take p and a homogeneous menu y such
that fpg  fqg for all q 2 y.
Dene, for v 2 V , a(v) = supfa 2 [ 1; 1]jau(p)+p1  a2v(p)  maxq2y au(q)+p
1  a2v(q)g and w(v) = a(v)u +p1  a(v)2v. If w = au + p1  a2v, w(p) 
maxq2y w(q) is equivalent to a  a(v), i.e. to w u w(v). Thus, we have
V (y[fpg) = u(p)
Z
v2V
(f ~w 2 Wj ~w u w(v)g)dv+u(q)
Z
v2V
(f ~w 2 Wjw(v) u ~wg)dv
where q is any element of y, while
y[fpg(p) =
Z
v2V
(f ~w 2 Wj ~w u w(v)g)dv 
Z
v2V
(f ~w 2 Wj ~w u w(v)g)dv
and hence V (fy [ fpgg)  y[fpg(p)u(p) + y[fpg(y)u(q)
For  < y[fpg(p), we obtain
fp+ (1  )qg)  fy[fpg(p)p+ y[fpg(y)qg  y [ fpg
which proves axiom 3.1.
We prove the "only if" part by contradiction. Suppose that there exists w 2 W
such that (f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg) < (f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg). Write w = au+p1  a2v,
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wherea 2 [ 1;1]. This condition is equivalent to(Cv(a;1)) < (Cv(a;1)). There-
fore, by the continuity of  and by theorem 10.2 ofBillingsley (2012) there exists
a 2 (a;1) such that (Cv(a;1)) + (C(a;1)) < (Cv(a;1)).
Consider > 0,  > 0 and  > 0. Take ~w 2 V n fvg. Sincev 6= ~w, by the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we havejv: ~wj < 1, thus it is possible to nd  ~w such
that  >  ~wv: ~w, and v: ~w <  ~w.
Dene now: (i) p = 1 + (u + v); (ii) qv = 1 + vv where v is chosen
to satisfy au(p) + p1  a2v(p) = au(qv) +
p
1  a2v(qv); (iii) for all ~w 2 V such
that (C ~w) > 0 and ~w 6= v, q ~w = 1 +  ~w ~w. Consider nally the menu y =
fqvg [
S
~w 6=vfq ~wg. y is nite since  has a nite number of directions. Notice that
u(q ~w) = u(qv) = 0 for all ~w, and that u(p) > 0.
We havew(p) = w(qv) by denition of v. Moreover,(
w(p) = (a + p1  a2)
w(q ~w) = 
p
1  a2 ~wv: ~w for ~w 6= v
Since >  ~wv: ~w, it is possible to pick low enough to ensure thatw(p) 
w(q ~w). In that case, on the setCv, p is chosen in the sety [ fpg if and only if the
intensity of temptation lies in [a;1]4. Thereforey[fpg(p)  (Cv(a;1)).
Finally, suppose that w^ = a^u +
p
1  (a^)2 ~w, where ~w 6= v. We have(
w^(p) = (a^ + p1  (a^)2v: ~w)
w^(q ~w) = 
p
1  (a^)2 ~w
Sincev: ~w <  ~w, it is possible to pick low enough to obtainw^(p) < w^(q ~w) as
soon as^a < a. This proves thatp is chosen iny[fpg at most onCv(a;1)[C(a;1).
Therefore
V (y [ fpg)  [(Cv(a;1)) + (C(a; 1))]u(p) + [1   (Cv(a;1))   (C(a;1))]u(q)
< (Cv(a;1))u(p) + (1   (Cv(a;1)))u(q)
 y[fpg(p)u(p) + y[fpg(y)u(q)
It is sucient to take  2 ((Cv(a;1)) + (C(a; 1)); (Cv(a;1))) to obtain a
violation of axiom 3.1.
Lemma A.3. (; ) satises axiom 3.2 if and only if for any w 2 W,
4Remember that  picks a maximizer of u in case of indierence, and p is the unique maximizer
of u in y [ fpg.
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(f ~w 2 Wjw u ~wg)  (f ~w 2 Wjw u ~wg).
Proof. We skip the proof. The arguments are similar to the demonstration of
lemma A.2.
1.2 Proof of necessity
Suppose that (u; ; ; ) is sophisticated, i.e. that  = . The conditions of
lemmas A.3 and A.2 are trivially true. Therefore, axioms 3.1 and 3.2 are satised.
Suppose now that (u; ; ; ) is naive. The condition of lemma A.2 is satised,
therefore axiom 3.1 is valid. In addition, the continuity of  yields (fug) = 0.
Suppose that (u; ; ; ) is strictly naive, i.e. that there exists w 2 W such
that
(f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg) > (f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg) (A.1)
Our next step is to show that this particular w satises
(f ~w 2 Wjw u ~wg) < (f ~w 2 Wjw u ~wg)
and to use lemma A.3 to conclude that axiom 3.2 is violated.
Suppose, in contrast, that
(f ~w 2 Wjw u ~wg)  (f ~w 2 Wjw u ~wg) (A.2)
Summing A.1 and A.2 yields
(Cv) > (f ug) + (Cv) (A.3)
Take ~w 2 V n fvg. Since (u; ; ; ) is naive, (C ~w(b; 1))  (C ~w(b; 1)) for all
b >  1. Taking the limit when b tends to  1 shows that
(C ~w)  (C ~w) (A.4)
Integrating A.4 and summing with A.3 yieldsZ
w^2W
d(w^) = (Cv) +
Z
~w2Vnfvg
(C ~w)d ~w
> (f ug) + (Cv) +
Z
~w2Vnfvg
(C ~w)d ~w =
Z
w^2W
d(w^)
which is impossible since
R
w^2W d(w^) =
R
w^2W d(w^) = 1.
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1.3 Proof of suciency
Suppose that (; ) satises axioms 3.1 and 3.2.
By lemma A.2 we have (f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg)  (f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg) for any
w 2 W , and by A.3 (f ~w 2 Wjw u ~wg)  (f ~w 2 Wjw u ~wg). We further
obtain (f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg) = (f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg) using the same argument
as in the proof of necessity above. Hence,  and  coincide on all sets that are
closed and closed by u. Dekel and Lipman (2012) show that this is a sucient
condition for the measures  and  to coincide on all Borel sets (see their proof of
theorem 1). This proves that  = .
Suppose now that (; ) satises axiom 3.1 but violates axiom 3.2. We have
(f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg)  (f ~w 2 Wj ~w u wg) for every w. If this holds with
equality for every w, this implies  = , which contradicts the fact that (; )
violates axiom 3.2. Therefore there exists w such that the inequality is strict, and
the representation is naive.
2 Remaining proofs of section 3
2.1 Proof of proposition 3.1
We only prove the equivalence between realism and sophistication, the second
part of the proposition being proved similarly. Suppose rst that f; ) is realistic.
Take a homogeneous menu y, q 2 y, p such that fpg  fqg and  < y[fpg. We
have
V (y [ fpg) = V (fy[fpg(p)p+
X
~q2y
y[fpg(~q)~qg) since (; ) is realistic at y [ fpg
= y[fpg(p)u(p) + y[fpg(y)u(q) since y is homogenous
> u(p) + (1  )q = V (fp+ (1  )qg)
Hence, f; g satises axiom 3.1. A similar proof shows that f; g satises
axiom 3.2. By theorem 3.1, f; g is sophisticated.
Suppose now that f; g is sophisticated, and consider a nite menu x. x can
be decomposed in k disjoint non-empty equivalence classes Ei; i = 1;    ; k such
that p 2 Ei; q 2 Ej imply u(p) > u(q) if and only if i < j, and u(p) = u(q) if i = j.
It is therefore possible to dene x(Ei) = (fw 2 WjMu(Mw(x)) 2 Eig) the
anticipated probability attached to the class Ei5. Since  =  and both measures
5The representation does not specify how the choice is made inside a class Ei between two
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break ties in favor of u, it is easy to see that x(Ei) = x(Ei) for any i. Writing pi
for any element of the class Ei, we obtain
V (x) =
kX
i=1
x(Ei)u(pi) =
kX
i=1
x(Ei)u(pi) = V (f
X
x2p
x(p)pg)
which proves that x  fPp2x x(p)pg. Hence, f; g is realistic.
2.2 Proof of proposition 3.2
(i) , (ii) This result is proved by Dekel and Lipman (2012) in their Theorem
4, p. 1284.
(i) ) (iii) Consider a menu x, and a lottery  2 (x). Since (1; ) is more
naive than (2; ),
f
X
p2x
ppg 1 x) f
X
p2x
ppg 2 x
Therefore N2;(x)  N1;(x), which implies N2;(x)  N1;(x).
(iii)) (i) For i = 1; 2, we write Vi the functional associated with i and u the
(common) normative utility function. Consider a menu x. A lottery  on (x)
belongs to Ni;(x) if and only ifX
p2x
x(p)u(p) <
X
p2x
pu(p) < Vi(x)
Hence, from N1;(x)  N2;(x) we obtain V1(x)  V2(x). Now, for any
lottery p we have
fpg 1 x, u(p) > V1(x)) u(p) > V2(x), fpg 2 x
which proves that (1; ) is more naive than (2; ).
2.2.1 Proof of proposition 3.3
We skip the proof, which relies on the same arguments as proposition 3.2.
options that are equally valued at the ex post stage, but this choice is irrelevant here.
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3 Proofs of section 4
3.1 Proof of theorem 4.1
The proof is given by Dekel and Lipman (2012) (see their theorem 5 p. 1286).
3.2 Proof of proposition 4.1
In the two goods case, only two generic utilities u 2 W exist: u = (
p
2
2
; 
p
2
2
)
and  u. Therefore each subjective utility can be written vs = su where s 6= 0.
A Random Gul-Pesendorfer representation is simply written
V (x) =
X
s2S
s[max
p2x
(1 + s)u(p) max
q2x
su(q)] (A.5)
The decision utility (1+s)u coincides with u if and only if s >  1. A Random
Expected Utility model  simply species the weights u and  u attached to the
states u and  u respectively.
Proof of necessity If(; ) admits a sophisticated Random Strotz representa-
tion, necessity of axioms 3.2 and 4.1 are established in section 3. Suppose that
(; ) admits a sophisticated Random Gul-Pesendorfer representation, i.e. that
there exists a representation A.5 of  such thatPs2S;s> 1 s = u. Equation A.5
yields
V (fp; qg) =
X
s2S;s>0
su(p)+
X
s2S; 1<s<0
s[u(p) + s(u(p)  u(q))]+
X
s2S;s< 1
su(q)
(A.6)
If there exists p; q such that fpg  fqg and fp;qg(p) > 0 then u > 0. ThereforeP
s2S;s> 1 s > 0, and by equation A.6, V (fp; qg) > V (fqg), which proves that
(; ) satises axiom 4.1.
In addition, since u(p) + s(u(p)   u(q)) < u(p) when s < 0, equation A.6
yields
V (fp; qg) 
X
s2S;s> 1
su(p) +
X
s2S;s< 1
su(q)
 uu(p) +  uu(q) = V (ffp;qg(p)p+ fp;qg(q)qg)
which proves that axiom 3.2 holds.
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Proof of suciency Suppose rst that u = 0. In that case, for any p; q such
that fpg  fqg we have fp;qg(p) = 0, which by axiom 3.2 implies fp; qg  fqg.
This identies the Random Strotz representation associated with , given by
V = minu. This function attaches a weight equal to 1 to the state  u, therefore
the joint representation is sophisticated.
If u > 0, let us dene u =
P
s2S;s>0 s +
P
s2S;0<s<1 ss and rewrite
equation A.6 under the form
V (x) = umax
p2x
u(p) + (1  u)min
q2x
u(q)
Axiom 4.1 yields u > 0. If axiom 3.1 is satised, a direct adaptation of
theorem 3.1 proves the existence of a sophisticated joint representation under the
Random Strotz interpretation. If axiom 3.1 is violated, we obtain u < u. It is
therefore possible to rewrite
V (x) = u[max
p2x
u
u
u(p) max
q2x
(
u
u
  1)u(q)] +  umin
q2x
u(q) (A.7)
Equation A.7 denes a sophisticated representation of , since the function V
attaches weights equal to (u;  u) to the states (u; u) respectively.
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Appendix B: Unidimensional Random Strotz models
This appendix proves theorem 2.1, and provides another characterization of
unidimensional Random Strotz representations. Unlike the rest of the paper, this
part does not assume any conditions on  except non-triviality: continuity and
niteness are not required. The preference  is here dened over compact menus,
as in Dekel and Lipman (2012).
1 Proof of Theorem 2.1
1.1 Necessity of axiom 2.1
Lemma B.4. Suppose that  has a unidimensional Random Strotz representation
(u; ) with direction v 2 V such that (Cv) > 0. Consider two lotteries q1 and q2
verifying fq1g  fq2g, and suppose that there exists a lottery z such that fzg 
fq1g  fq2g. The two following statements are equivalent: (i) There exists a
menu x such that fpg  fq1g  fq2g for any p 2 x and x [ fq1g  x [ fq2g; (ii)
v(q1) < v(q2).
Proof. We prove (i) ) (ii) by contrapositive. fq1g  fq2g implies u(q1) = u(q2).
Suppose that v(q1)  v(q2), and take any x such that u(p) > u(q1). If w 2 Cv,
we can write w = au +
p
1  a2v, where jaj  1, and obtain w(q1) = au(q1) +p
1  a2v(q1)  au(q2)+
p
1  a2v(q2) = w(q2). Since the support of  is included
in Cv, q1 dominates q2 on all the possible subjective states. For i = 1; 2, we write

x[fqig(qi) = fw 2 Cvjw(qi) > maxp2xw(p)g the list of subjective states on which
qi is chosen. The observation above yields 

x[fq2g(q2)  
x[fq1g(q1), and hence
V (x [ fq1g) = (
x[fq1g(q1))u(q1) +
Z
w/2
x[fq1g(q1)
max
p2Mw(x)
u(p)(dw)
 (
x[fq2g(q2))u(q2) +
Z
w/2
x[fq2g(q2)
max
p2Mw(x)
u(p)(dw)
 V (x [ fq2g)
This proves that x [ fq2g  x [ fq1g.
(ii) ) (i). Suppose that u(q1) = u(q2) and v(q1) < v(q2). Consider an
increasing sequence 0 < an < 1 of limit 1, and the increasing sequence of sets
Cv( an; an). This sequence has limit Cv which has positive measure, therefore by
theorem 10.2 of Billingsley (2012) we have (Cv( an; an)) > 0 for n large enough.
Dene a = an.
40
Consider now a number  such that: 0 <  <
p
1 a2
2a
[v(q2)   v(q1)]. Such a
number exists since a 2 (0; 1) and v(q2) > v(q1). Suppose rst that we can nd
 small enough to ensure that p = 1
2
q1 +
1
2
q2 + u is a legitimate lottery. Notice
that u(p) > u(q1); u(q2) and that
au(p) +
p
1  a2v(p) = a + au(q2) +
p
1  a2[1
2
v(q1) +
1
2
v(q2)]
< au(q2) +
p
1  a2v(q2)
Therefore q2 dominates p over the set Cv( 1; a). Similarly,
 au(p) +
p
1  a2v(p) =  a   au(q1) +
p
1  a2[1
2
v(q1) +
1
2
v(q2)]
>  au(q1) +
p
1  a2v(q1)
And hence p dominates q1 over the set Cv( a; 1).
Thus we obtain 
fp;q1g(q1)  
fp;q2g(q2), and Cv( a; a)  
fp;q2g(q2)n
fp;q1g(q1).
Since (Cv( a; a)) > 0, this yields (
fp;q1g(q1)) < (
fp;q2g(q2)).
Hence
V (fp; q1g) = (
fp;q1g(q1))u(q1) + (1  (
fp;q1g(q1)))u(p)
> (
fp;q2g(q2))u(q2) + (1  (
fp;q2g(q2)))u(p) = V (fp; q2g)
Therefore the triple (x = fpg; q1; q2) satises x [ fq1g  x [ fq2g.
If
1
2
q1+
1
2
q2+u is not a lottery for any  > 0, since
1
2
q1+
1
2
q2 is not a maximizer
of u among (Z), a standard separation argument shows that it is possible to nd
~u 2 W that satises u:~u > 0 and such that 1
2
q1 +
1
2
q2 + ~u is a lottery. The same
construction holds with a large enough to satisfy au:~u >
p
1  a2 and  such that
0 < [au:~u + 
p
1  a2] <
p
1  a2
2
[v(q2)  v(q1)].
To prove the necessity of axiom 2.1, consider a unidimensional Random Strotz
(u; ) with direction v. If (Cv) = 0, then (fu; ug) = 1, thus for any (x; q1; q2)
such that fpg  fq1g  fq2g for all p 2 x, we have x [ fq1g  x [ fq2g, and the
condition of axiom 2.1 is trivially satised.
Suppose now that (Cv) > 0 and take (x; y; q1; q2) such that fpg  fq1g  fq2g
for all p 2 x and x[fq1g  x[fq2g. Since q1 and q2 do not maximize u on (Z),
the implication (i)) (ii) of lemma B.4 yields v(q1) < v(q2), which in turn implies
y [ fq1g  y [ fq2g. This completes the proof of necessity.
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1.2 Suciency of axiom 2.1
Suppose that the representation (u; ) of  is not unidimensional. It is clear
that (C( 1; 1)) > 0, otherwise we would have (fu; ug) = 1 and therefore
(Cv) = 1 for any v 2 V .
Claim B.1. There exists  < 1 such that (Cv) < (C( ; )) for all v 2 V .
Proof. If this is not the case, there exists an increasing sequence 0 < an < 1 of
limit 1, and a sequence vn 2 V such that
(Cvn)  (C( an; an)) (B.1)
Take m suciently large to guarantee (C( am; am)) > 1
2
(C( 1; 1)). This
is possible since C( am; am) is an increasing sequence of limit C( 1; 1), which
has positive measure. Suppose that vn is not constant for n  m. We can nd
v1 6= v2 such that (Cv1) >
1
2
(C( 1; 1) and (Cv2) >
1
2
(C( 1; 1), which implies
(Cv1 [ Cv2) > (C( 1; 1)). This is a contradiction, since Cv1 [ Cv2  C( 1; 1).
Hence, vn is constant for n large enough. Denote v
 its limit, and take the limit
in B.1. We obtain (Cv)  (C( 1; 1)), which further implies
(Cv) = (fu; ug) + (Cv)
 (fu; ug) + (C( 1; 1)) = 1
And hence, (Cv) = 1. This is a contradiction, since (u; ) is not unidimensional.
For each v 2 V , we dene B(v; ) = fw 2 Vjkw   vk < g the open ball of
radius  and center v, restricted to utilities which are orthogonal to u. We also
dene
A(v; ) =
[
w2B(v;)
Cw = fau+
p
1  a2wj   1 < a < 1; w 2 V ; kw   vk < g
A(v; ) contains the utilities whose direction lies in the open ball of center v and
radius .
Claim B.2. For any  > 0 low enough, there exists two expected utilities v1 and
v2 such that (A(v1; )) > 0, (A(v2; )) > 0 and kv1   v2k > 7.
Proof. Consider  dened by claim B.1.  can be chosen high enough to guarantee
that (C( ; )) > 0. The set C( ; ) = fau + p1  a2w;w 2 V ; jaj  g is
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compact since it is closed and bounded. Moreover, it is covered by the union of
the open sets A(v; ) for all v 2 V . By the Borel-Lebesgue theorem, there exists
a nite family F  V such that fA(v; )gv2F covers C( ; ). An immediate
implication is that
P
v2F (A(v; )) > 0.
Let us show that, if  is low enough, this subcovering contains at least two
sets of positive measure that can be separated as stated in the claim. We proceed
by contradiction. Suppose that for any  > 0, there exists  < , a nite subset
F such that fA(v; )gv2F covers C( ; ), and v 2 F such that for any v 2 F,
(A(v; )) > 0 ) kv   vk < 7. Notice that
S
v2B(v;7)A(v; )  A(v; 8).
Hence, since
P
v2F\B(v;7) (A(v; ))  (C( ; )), we obtain (A(v; 8)) 
(C( ; )).
Consider a decreasing sequence n ! 0. By the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem,
the sequence vn = vn dened over the compact V admits a convergent subse-
quence. To simplify the notation, let us assume that vn is itself convergent to a
value v. For any n, we have (A(vn; 8n))  (C( ; )). Our next step is to
show that we can take the limit in this inequality and obtain (Cv)  (C( ; )).
Notice that
(A(v; 8n)) (A(vn; 8n)) = (
[
w2B(v;8n)nB(vn;8n)
Cw) (
[
w2B(vn;8n)nB(v;8n)
Cw)
(B.2)
Consider the sets
Gn =
+1[
m=n
[
w2B(v;8m)nB(vm;8m)
Cw
Gm is decreasing and has for limit limn!+1 Gn = ;. Thus, limn!+1 (Gn) = 0,
and since
S
w2B(v;8n)nB(vn;8n) Cw  Gn, we obtain
lim
n!+1
(
[
w2B(v;8n)nB(vn;8n)
Cw) = 0
A similar argument proves that
lim
n!+1
(
[
w2B(vn;8n)nB(v;8n)
Cw) = 0
Moreover, the sequence of sets fA(v; 8n)g is decreasing and converges to Cv
when n! +1. Thus, taking the limit in equation B.2 shows that (A(vn; 8n))!
(Cv), which implies (Cv)  (C( ; )). This latter inequality contradicts the
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statement in claim B.1. This completes the proof of claim B.2.
If v 2 V , we write Av( 1; a) = fau+
p
1  a2wj 1 < a < a; w 2 V\B(v; )g:
it contains the utilities whose direction lies in the open ball of center v and radius
, and whose intensity lies strictly between  1 and by a.
Claim B.3. For any  > 0 small enough, there exists v1; v2 2 V and a < 1 such
that
kv1   v2k > 7 and
min((Av1( 1; a)); (Av2( 1; a))) > (C( 1; a))
Proof. Take v1 and v2 given by claim B.2. The proof stems immediately from
the fact that (Av1( 1; a)) and (Av2( 1; a)) converge to positive values when
a ! 1, while (C( 1; a)) tends to zero.
Claim B.4. For any  small enough, there exists three numbers ; ;  such that
 > 0, 8>><>>:
 > 
 supw2B(v2;3)w:v1 <  infw2B(v2;3)w:v2
 supw2B(v1;3)w:v2 <  infw2B(v1;3)w:v1
and 8>><>>:
 < 
 infw2B(v1;)w:v1 >  supw2B(v1;)w:v2
 infw2B(v2;)w:v2 >  supw2B(v2;)w:v1
Proof. Suppose that w 2 B(v1; ). We have
w:v1 =
1
2
(kwk2 + kv1k2   kw   v1k2)
= 1  1
2
kw   v1k2
> 1  1
2
2
And since kw v2k  kv1 v2k kw v1k  6, we also obtain w:v2 < 1  1
2
(6)2.
Similarly, infw2B(v2;)w:v2 > 1 
1
2
2, and supw2B(v2;)w:v1 < 1 
1
2
(6)2. Hence, if
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 is small enough for the denominators to be positive, the ratios
supw2B(v2;)w:v1
infw2B(v2;) v:w2
and
supw2B(v1;)w:v2
infw2B(v1;)w:v1
are bounded above away from 1. It is thus easy to nd  and
 that satisfy the conditions. A similar reasoning can be applied to nd .
To complete the proof, take  > 0,  low enough to ensure that w:v1 > 0
as soon as w1 2 B(v1; 3), and w:v2 > 0 as soon as w2 2 B(v2; 3), and take
a; v1; v2; ; ;  dened by claims B.3 and B.4. Dene p1 = 1 + (u + v1),
p2 = 1+ (u+ v2), r1 = 1+ (u+ v1) and r2 = 1+ (u+ v2), and for any
w 2 V such that w /2 B(v1; 3) [ B(v2; 3) , zw = 1 + (u + w). u is indierent
between all these elements, with valuation . Consider the menu x containing
p1; p2 and all the zw, and the menu y containing r1; r2 and all the zw.
Dene now q1 = 1+ v1 and q2 = 1+ v2. We have u(q1) = u(q2) = 0 < ,
hence q1 and q2 are normatively inferior to all elements of x and y. Our next step
is to show that q1 is more tempting than q2 with respect to the menu y, while q2
is more tempting than q1 with respect to the menu y.
Consider the ex post choice in x[fq1g. It is clear that q1 is chosen by  u and
not chosen by u. Consider w /2 fu; ug, and write w = au + p1  a2w, where
 a  a  1. We have
w(q1) = 
p
1  a2w:v1 (B.3)
Suppose rst, that w 2 B(v1; 3). We have
w(p1) = a+ 
p
1  a2w:v1 (B.4)
Compare B.3 with B.4. Since  >  and a < 1 one can pick  low enough to
impose the inequality w(p1) > w(q1) for all values of a  a. Given this choice, p1
dominates q1 if w 2 B(v1; 3) and a   a.
Suppose now that w 2 B(v2; 3). We have
w(p2) = a+ 
p
1  a2w:v2 (B.5)
Compare B.3 with B.5, and notice that  infw:v2 >  supw:v1 by claim B.4.
Hence, again, if  is low enough, p2 dominates q1 if w 2 B(v2; 3) and a   a.
Finally, suppose that w /2 B(v1; 3) [ B(v2; 3). Notice that
w(zw) = a+ 
p
1  a2 (B.6)
Compare B.3 and B.6. v1:w is uniformly bounded away from 1 since kw v1k  3.
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Hence, by the same argument as above, if  is small enough, q1 is dominated by
zw if w /2 B(v1; 3) [ B(v2; 3) and a   a.
To sum up, if  is low enough, q1 is never chosen in x [ fq1g by a state
whose intensity of temptation is stronger than  a. Therefore, denoting x[fq1g =
(fw 2 Wjw(q1) > maxp2xw(p)g) the ex ante probability of choosing q1 we have
x[fq1g(q1)  (f ug) + (C( 1; a)) (B.7)
Consider now the anticipated choice in the set y [ fq1g in a state of the form
w = au+
p
1  a2w where a < a and w 2 B(v1; ). Notice that
w(r1) = a+ 
p
1  a2w:v1 (B.8)
Since  > , v1:w > 0 and a < a
 < 1, by equations B.3and B.8 it is possible to
take  low enough to ensure that w(r1) < w(q1). Observe now that
w(r2) = a+ 
p
1  a2w:v2 (B.9)
But by claim B.4, we have  infw:v1 >  supw:v2. Hence we can choose  low
enough to ensure that w(r2) < w(q1).
Finally, for any w^ /2 B(v1; 3) [ B(v2; 3) it is easy to show that w^:w < w:v1.
Thus, since w(zw^) = a+ 
p
1  a2w^:w, we obtain w(zw^) < w(q1) for any w^ as
soon as a < a, if  is chosen small enough.
To sum up, q1 is the single maximizer y [ fq1g at least on the utilities of
the form au +
p
1  a2w, where w 2 B(v1; ) and a < a, which means that the
probability of choosing it veries
y[fq1g(q1)  (f ug) + (Av1( 1; a)) (B.10)
The same arguments prove that the choice of q2 in x or y satises
x[fq2g(q2)  (f ug) + (Av2( 1; a)) (B.11)
and
y[fq2g(q2)  (f ug) + (C( 1; a)) (B.12)
Compare equations B.7 and B.11. By claim B.3, we obtain x[fq1g(q1) <
x[fq2g(q2), which implies x [ fq1g  x [ fq2g. In contrast, by equations B.10
and B.12, y[fq1g(q1) > y[fq2g(q2), which implies y [ fq1g  y [ fq2g. These two
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properties together violate axiom 2.1.
2 An alternative characterization
2.1 Representation theorem
In this section we show that Unidimensional Random Strotz representations
are characterized by another intuitive behavioral property.
Axiom B.1 (Unique Temptation).
If fpg  fqg for any p 2 x[y, then x  x[fqg; y  y[fqg ) x[y  x[y[fqg.
Axiom B.1 also characterizes unidimensional models, with one caveat: if the
support of  cannot be bounded away from  u, the consequent x[y  x[y[fqg
is always true because all inferior options are tempting. Axiom B.1 has no content
in that case. To overcome this issue, we impose another property that guarantees
the existence of a higher bound on the intensity of the temptation.
Axiom B.2 (Limited Temptation).
9x 2 A; q 2 (Z) such that fpg  fqg for any p 2 x [ y and x  x [ fqg.
Axiom B.2 is a richness condition: it simply states that some options in the
choice set are not tempting. This condition is innocuous, since it is satised if an
option that appears extremely undesirable both ex ante and ex post is added to
the set of prizes. We will rst show that axiom B.2 is equivalent to the existence
of a a neighborhood of f ug of measure zero; and then proceed to show that,
among the Random Strotz models that satisfy axiom B.2, unidimensional models
are characterized by axiom B.1.
Lemma B.5. Suppose that  has a Random Strotz representation (u; ). The
following statements are equivalent: (i)  satises axiom B.2; (ii) there exists
a >  1 such that (C( 1; a)) = 0.
Proof. (ii) ) (i). Suppose that  satises (ii) for some a >  1. Consider a pair
(; ) such that  > 0 and a+
p
1  a2 > 0. Dene q = 1 and pv = 1+(u+v)
for v 2 V , where  > 0 is taken suciently small for pv to be an interior lottery
for all v. We have u(pv) =  > u(q) = 0 for all v, and
au(pv) +
p
1  a2v(pv) = (a+
p
1  a2) > 0 = au(q) +
p
1  a2v(q)
This shows that x[fqg(q)  (C( 1; a)) = 0, and and hence x  x [ fqg.
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(i)) (ii). Suppose that (ii) does not hold, i.e. that for any a >  1, we have
(C( 1; a)) > 0.
Consider now x and q such that u(p) > u(q) for any p 2 x. Consider the
function a : V  x) ( 1; 1) dened by the equation
a(v; p)p
1  a(v; p)2 =
v(q)  v(p)
u(p)  u(q) (B.13)
equation B.13 uniquely denes a value a(v; p) such that a(v; p) >  1. More-
over, a is continuous in the product topology. By Tychono's theorem, V  x is
compact since V and x are compact. Thus, inf(v;p)2Vx a(v; p) >  1. Take any
a such that  1 < a < inf(v;p)2Vx a(v; p), any (v; p) 2 X  a. By equation B.13
we have au(p) +
p
1  a2v(p) < au(q) +p1  a2v(q). Hence, 
x[fqg  C( 1; a),
which yields (
x[fqg) > 0, and nally x [ fqg  x. Since this result is obtained
for any pair (x; q), the preference  does not satisfy axiom B.2.
Theorem B.1. Suppose that  has a Random Strotz representation (u; ), and
that  satises axiom B.2. (u; ) is Unidimensional if and only if  satises
axiom B.1.
2.2 Necessity of axiom B.1
Suppose that  has a Unidimensional Random Strotz representation (u; ) of
direction v. Take a triple (x; y; q) such that fpg  fqg for any p 2 x[y, x  x[fqg
and y  y [ fqg. The same arguments used to nd a in the proof of lemma B.5
can be used to obtain
ax = sup fa 2 [ 1; 1]jau(q) +
p
1  a2v(q)  sup
p2x
au(p) +
p
1  a2v(p)g
and ay similarly by substituting y for x. x  x [ fqg and y  y [ fqg imply
(f ug)+(Cv( 1; ax)) > 0 and (f ug)+(f ug)+(Cv( 1; ay)) > 0. Dene
a = min(ax; ay). It is easy to see that q is chosen in the menu x [ y [ fqg by  u
and by all the utilities of the form ~au +
p
1  ~a2v where  1 < ~a < a, and that
this set has positive measure. As a consequence, x [ y  x [ y [ fqg.
2.3 Suciency of axiom B.1
We prove the suciency of the axiom by contrapositive. Suppose that the Ran-
dom Strotz representation (u; ) of  is not unidimensional, and that  satises
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axiom B.2.
Claim B.5. For any  > 0 low enough, there exists v1; v2 2 V and a 2 (0; 1) such
that: (i) (Av1( 1; a)) > 0, (ii) (Av2( 1; a)) > 0, (iii) kv1  v2k > 7, and (iv)
(C( 1; a))) = 0.
Proof. The rst three parts come from claims B.2 and B.3 in the proof of theorem
2.1. Part (iv) comes from lemma B.5.
Take ;  > 0 and dene now q = 1, and: (i) for any w^ /2 B(v1; 3), pw^ =
1 + u + (w^   v1); (ii) for any w^ /2 B(v2; 3), rw^ = 1 + u + (w^   v2).  and
 can be taken small enough to make sure that these elements are well-dened
lotteries. Dene also x = fpw^gw^/2B(v1;3) and y = frw^gw^/2B(v2;3). We observe that u
equals  > u(q) = 0 on any element of x [ y.
Consider the choice made in x[fqg. Take w 2 W , written w = au+p1  a2w.
Suppose that w 2 B(v1; ). We have w(q) = 0, and for any w^ /2 B(v1; 3),
w(pw^) = a+
p
1  a2(w^:w   v1:w)
In addition, we have
w^:w =
1
2
(kw^k2 + kwk2   kw   w^k2)
= 1  1
2
kw   w^k2
 1  22
since kw   w^k  kw^   v1k   kw   v1k  2.
A similar argument shows that v1:w  1   
2
2
, which implies w^:w   v1:w <
 3
2
2
< 0. Therefore we can choose  small enough such that the inequality
w(pw^) < 0 is satised provided that a < a
. We obtain 
x[fqg(q)  Av1( 1; a),
which implies x[fqg(q) > 0, and hence x [ fqg  x. Similarly, we choose  small
enough to obtain y [ fqg  y.
Suppose now that w /2 B(v1; 3). We have
w(pw) = a+
p
1  a2(1  v1:w)
And since kv1   wk  3, v1:w < 1  9
2
2
. Therefore we can choose  low enough
to ensure that w(pw) > 0 is satised as soon as a   a. Similarly, if  is small
enough and w /2 B(v2; 3), the inequality w(rw) > 0 is satised if a   a. Since
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kv1   v2k > 7, (W n B(v1; 3)) [ (W n B(v2; 3)) = W . This proves that, if
a   a, in every direction w, q is dominated by an element of x [ y. Therefore
x[y[fqg(q)  (C( 1; a)) = 0, and thus x[ y[fqg  x[ y. The triple (x; y; q)
violates axiom B.1.
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